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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
J O S E P H M. Q U A G L I A N A and
P A U L A L. Q U A G L I A N A ,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
.;• ••..-.

'.: .•

. . . .

v s .

EXQUISITE HOME BUILDERS,
INC., and A L L A N K R U C K E N B E R G , G A R Y M A R G E T T S , d-b-a
KM DESIGN,

Case No.
13723

Defendants and Respondents.

B R I E F OF RESPONDENT
E X Q U I S I T E H O M E B U I L D E R S , INC.

N A T U R E OF T H E CASE
This is an action upon two separate contracts byproperty owners against a building contractor and designers or draftsman wherein the building contractor
and the designers both counterclaimed against the property owners.
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D I S P O S I T I O N IN L O W E R COURT
This action was tried to the court sitting without a
jury. Judgment was entered for the contractor in the
amount of $1,577.73, together with attorney's fees of
$1,182.00, and for the designers in the amount of
$500.00.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., seeks
an affirmation of its judgment against plaintiffs.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant Exquisite Home Builders, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Exquisite) disagrees, in material
part, to the Statement of Facts submitted by plaintiffs.
Sometime during the early part of the year 1971,
Dr. and Mrs. Quagliana (plaintiffs and appellants)
considered the prospect of building a home (R. 164).
For this purpose the plaintiffs elected to use house plans
which had previously been used by Mrs. Quagliana's
father (R. 164). Since those plans were inadequate
(R. 350) and since the plaintiff desired to change those
plans (R. 165), defendant Margetts of K M Design
was contacted (R. 165).
At the time KM Design was contacted, the plaintiffs had not yet found or purchased a lot upon which
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the house was to be constructed (R. 166). The Quagliana insisted that any lot provide a view of the valley
from the back of the house (R. 167), and this requirement was conveyed to Mr. Margetts (R. 346). The
services of KM Design were contracted for the purpose of drawing a complete set of plans (R. 167, 334).
During his meetings with Dr. Quagliana, Margetts referred the names of general contractors engaged in
home construction, including the name of defendant
Exquisite Home Builders, Inc. (R. 167).
The Quaglianas immediately commenced a search
for a lot upon which to construct the home (R. 167).
At about this same time, Dr. Quagliana contacted
Philip Marstella, an employee of Exquisite (R. 167).
Since Marstella was also a licensed real estate broker
(R. 278), he brought to Dr. Quagliana's attention a
lot which was for sale and looked at other lots which
were found by Dr. Quagliana (R. 279). Dr. Quagliana
found the subject lot at 2965 Sherwood Drive and Marstella similarly took a look at that lot (R. 279). At
that time Dr. Quagliana had no plans in his possession
(R. 279) and did not own the particular lot on Sherwood Drive (R. 279). At that time the lot was not for
sale and Dr. Quagliana did not know who owned it (R.
168).
Similarly, Margetts visited the subject lot in the
company of Dr. Quagliana (R. 335). At the time Margetts and Dr. Quagliana visited the subject lot, work
was underway in drawing the plans (R. 336). On that
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occasion Margetts walked on the lot and showed Dr.
Quagliana approximately how the house, and particularly the back of the house where the windows were
located, would sit in relation to the lot (R. 346). At
this time Margetts and Dr. Quagliana had in their possession the floor plan of Mrs. Quagliana's father (R.
346). Dr. Quagliana specifically inquired concerning
the view and was told by Mr. Margetts that "there
would be a view" (R. 346). Margetts also expressed
his opinion that the lot "was a good lot" (R. 336). Before the lot was purchased by the Quaglianas, Margetts
drew at least a preliminary plot plan to see if the house
would fit on the lot (R. 187, 359).
The Quaglianas were successful in purchasing the
property on Sherwood Drive (R. 170). K M Design
then continued the drafting of a complete set of plans,
including a plot plan showing the location of the house
on the property (R. 170). In the process of drafting
the plot plan, Margetts consulted Salt Lake City with
respdct to the setbacks (R. 288, 340, 352, 356), but
did not consult with the St. Mary's Hills Architectural
Supervising Committee (R, 352). Mr. Margetts also
checked the plot plan to see that it had been drawn as
represented to Dr. Quagliana when on the subject lot
(R. 347), and the house was finally plotted as earlier
described by Margetts to Dr. Quagliana that it would
be (R. 348). The entire set of plans was completed
and delivered to Dr. Quagliana in July, 1971 (R. 337,
338, Ex. 1-P). Those plans showed a 20-foot setback
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between the garage and the front."property line (R. 186,
Ex. 1-P).
On October 7, 1971, a building contract was
entered into between plaintiffs and defendant Exquisite (R. 280, E x . 2-P). This building contract resulted from the submission of a bid by Exquisite (R.
280). In turn, the plans and specifications (Ex. 1-P)
having been delivered by Dr. Quagliana (R. 279), were
utilized in computing the bid (R. 280).
The general building contract (Ex. 2-P) was
drawn by Prudential Federal Savings as a requisite to
its loan of money to plaintiffs (R. 254). Exquisite took
no part in drafting the contract, did not requiest of Prudential Federal Savings that it draft the contract, and
did not have any relationship with Prudential Federal
Savings regarding draftsmanship (R. 254, 281).
The contract (Ex. 2-P) contained a clause incorporating therein the plans and specifications (Ex. 1-P).
Construction commenced shortly after the contract
was signed (R. 172). Marstella of Exquisite obtained
a building permit for the construction of the house at
2965 Sherwood Drive on October 14, 1971 (R. 281, Ex.
7-DE). At the time of obtaining the building permit,
Marstella submitted a copy of the plans as drawn by
KM Design and as furnished by plaintiffs to Salt Lake
City (R. 281). At the time of issuing the building permit, a representative of Salt Lake City crossed out the
5
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reference to 20 feet and inserted the word "average" (R.
298). A change of all setbacks to "average" is common
practice for Salt Lake City (R. 300).
On approximately October 14, 1971, Marstella of
Exquisite met on the construction site with personnel of
Gardner Engineering and delivered to them a copy of
the plot plan as drawn by K M Design (R. 282). Personnel of Gardner Engineering then staked out the lot,
and this they did in accordance to the plot plan drawn
by K M Design (R. 282). Excavation was commenced
by Terry Fuller Excavating shortly after October 14,
1975 (R. 283), and this excavation was completed according to the original plot plan (R. 317).
Several days later, after Exquisite had started
framing and excavating for the footings themselves (R.
283), Dr. Quagliana visited the construction site (R.
172, 283). Dr. Quagliana immediately became concerned that the house was not oriented exactly the way
Margetts mentioned it would be with the back of the
home facing the valley (R. 172). Dr. Quagliana expressed his concern as to the orientation of the house
to Mr. Marstella who was at the job site (R. 172, 283).
Dr. Quagliana next called K M Design and told Margetts that he didn't like the way the house was sitting on
the lot (R. 351). Within a day or two (R. 351), Margetts and Kruckenberg visited the excavation and
could see nothing wrong with the house as positioned
on the property at that point (R. 348). Marstella also
called Margetts and advised that Dr. Quagliana didn't
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like the position of the house on the lot (R. 351). Margetts declined to draw a new plot plan since he had not
been paid for his work (R. 351). Ultimately, Dr. Quagliana directed Marstella to rotate the home so that the
back of it would face the valley (R. 184). In arriving
at this decision, Dr. Quagliana had discussed the need
for a space for the possible addition of a swimming pool
and also the possibility of an immediate change in the
floor plan (R. 283). Dr. Quagliana also advised Mr.
Marstella of his intention to pay for the additional work
in altering the orientation of the home (R. 284); A new
plot plan was drawn by Gardner Engineering showing
a 20-foot setback on the garage corner (R. 284, Ex.
5-P.). Although there was conflict in the testimony,
Dr. Quagliana testified that Margetts of KM Design
approved the new plot and even voiced some enthusiasm
for it (R. 174, 175). As before, the new plot plan was
submitted to Salt Lake City (R. 284).
The lot was re-staked by Gardner Engineering (R.
284) and was re-excavated by Terry Fuller Excavating
(R. 285). The second excavation was completed in accordance with the second plot plan (R. 186). The footings were poured on November 12, 1971, and the
foundation was poured on December 7, 1971 (R. 285).
Both the footings and the forms for the foundation
were inspected and approved by Salt Lake City, the
latter inspection occurring on December 6, 1971 (R.
286,Ex. 6-DE).
During the course of construction, Dr. Quagliana
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received a call from some person living in the area who
advised him that the plans had never been reviewed bv
*he St. Mary's Hills Architectural Supervising Committee (R. 175). Dr. Quagliana immediately requested
of Mr. Marstella that he submit the plans to Mr. Elmer
Davis of the committee (R. 176, 286). This request
came from Dr. Quagliana at about the same time the
foundations were poured (R. 287). Marstella delivered
a set of plans as requested, and thereafter received a
letter from the St. Mary's Hills Architectural Supervising Committee (R. 287, Ex. 12-P). That letter advised that the plans did not conform to certain restrictive covenants in three respects: The roof pitch, which
was 4 to 12, could not exceed 3 % to 12; a topographic
plan was required; and the setback of 20 feet from the
front property line to the garage was less than the
minimum of 30-f eet (Ex. 12-P).

i
1
i

'
I

.I
i

Subsequent to the letter from the St. Mary's Hills
Architectural Supervising Committee, Marstella and
Southam of Exquisite met Dr. Quagliana at the University of Utah Hospital (R. 288). At that meeting
Dr. Quagliana expressed his growing dissatisfaction
with the neighbors and neighborhood and expressed his
belief that KM Design had checked out the items of
which the architectural committee was complaining (R.
289). At that meeting Dr. Quagliana expressed his
intention to speak personally to the members of the
St. Mary's Hills Architectural Supervising Committee (R. 288).
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On January 3, 1972, Dr. Quagliana instructed
officers of Prudential Federal Savings that they should
not disburse any further funds to Exquisite or its subcontractors (R. 189, 256, Ex. 13-DE). (Under the
general building contract, Exhibit 2-P, progress payments were to be made upon application of the contractor in order to finance the construction of the dwelling house.) When Exquisite called Prudential for an
inspection preparatory to sending in a draw, they were
advised that a hold had been placed on all funds and
that it would be useless to request a draw (R. 289,
330).
On January 4, 1972, Marstella and Southam of
Exquisite and Dr. Quagliana met with Dr. Quagliana's
attorney (R. 178, 290, 317). At that meeting Mr.
Southam (President of Exquisite) indicated his willingness to proceed with construction as directed by Dr.
Quagliana and to stand the expense of tearing out the
foundation and starting over again (R. 318). Several
proposals or alternatives were discussed (R. 180, 290,
318). Among those alternatives was a proposal to reduce the size of the garage, a proposal to tear out the
total construction and start over again with the mirror
image of the same floor plan, and a proposal to purchase the lot and partially completed structure for the
purpose of re-selling on speculation (R. 180, 290, 318).
(The testimony was that the original floor plan would
physically fit upon the subject lot with a 30-foot setback, but that the view would have been similar to that
of the original plot plan (R. 319, 291)). The meeting
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concluded when Dr. Quagliana or his attorney advised
that the proposals would be considered and that Exquisite would be advised of Dr. Quagliana's wishes (R.
293, 320). Nothing was then heard from Dr. Quagliana or his attorney until about February 23, 1972 (R.
293, 321). By letter of that date, Dr. Quagliana advised Exquisite of the price he would accept for sale
of the lot and partially completed home (Ex. 15-DE).
After some investigation, it was determined by Exquisite that it would not be feasible to purchase the
lot and foundation at the price asked by Dr. Quagliana
(R. 294, 321). Thereafter, Dr. Quagliana was advised
by Marstella that his asking price made it more feasible
to tear out the foundation and relocate the house (R.
295, Ex. 3-DE). At that time Mr. Marstella advised
Dr. Quagliana, through his attorney, that Exquisite
stood ready to tear out the foundation and relocate the
house (R. 295, Ex. 3-DE).
While awaiting direction from Dr. Quagliana as to
where he wanted the home located or what modifications
he desired in the floor plan, Exquisite proceeded with
plans for removal of the foundation (R. 321). During
this same general time period, Southam of Exquisite
contacted Terry Fuller of Terry Fuller Excavating
and discussed with him the method to be used in removing the foundation and disposing of the concrete
(R. 321, 326). Specifically, Southam asked Fuller if
he would locate a place where the broken concrete could
be dumped (R. 321, 326). Fuller proceeded with this
investigation and found a place in North Salt Lake
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where the broken concrete could be dumped (R. 326).
Exquisite received no further communication from
Dr. Quagliana indicating his wishes with respect to the
location of the home (R. 295, 321). However, Exquisite did receive from plaintiffs through their attorney
a letter dated March 9, 1972 (Ex. 16-DE). By that
letter, Exquisite was advised that the Quaglianas did
not wish to proceed further with construction of the
home and considered themselves excused from further
performance under the contract of October 7,1971 (Ex.
16-DE). In response to that letter, Exquisite addressed a letter of March 15, 1972, to the Quagliana's
attorney reminding him that Exquisite had, at all times,
remained ready, willing and able to tear out the foundation and relocate the house as directed by Dr. Quagliana (Ex. 3-DE).
Prudential Federal Savings advanced the sum of
$2,069.79 to Exquisite and its subcontractors to cover
the cost of construction (R. 328). The further sum of
$1,577.73 was paid to various subcontractors by Exquisite but was not reimbursed by plaintiffs or Prudential (R.330).
The Quaglianas sold the subject lot to Gale and
Joyce Smith on December 13, 1972, for the sum of
$23,750.00 (R. 266). The Smiths planned to and did
utilize the excavation and most of the foundation in
constructing a home (R. 266, 267). The subject lot
had been purchased by the Quaglianas for $20,485.00
(R. 266).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E F I N D I N G S OF FACT ARE SUPPORTED BY T H E EVIDENCE AND T H E
C O U R T M A D E F I N D I N G S O F F A C T ON A L L
MATERIAL
ISSUES
IN
COMPLIANCE
W I T H R U L E 52 O F T H E R U L E S O F C I V I L
PROCEDURE.
This is a case at law. That being so, it is not the
duty of the Supreme Court to weigh evidence, and any
substantial evidence will support the Findings and Judtnent. Osborn v. Peters, 69 Utah 391, 255 Pac. 435
(1927); and Cannon v. Wright, No. 13746, Feb. 13,
1975. I n Parrish v. Tahtaras, 7 Utah 2d 87, 318 P .
2d 642, 644 (1957), this Court held that it should merely review the evidence to ascertain whether the record
showed some competent evidence. This Court further
stated that the evidence should be viewed in a light
most favorable to the Findings:
" Since the court made findings and entered
judgment based thereon, it is our duty to review
the evidence in a light most favorable to the findings. In reciting the facts, therefore, we state
them as found by the trial court so long as the
record shows some competent evidence from
which such findings could derive."
Such a review of evidence will show that the Findings of the court are supported by substantial evidence
12
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and that Findings were made on all material issues.
Complaint is made on appeal that Finding No. 17 (R.
18) and Finding No. 31 (R. 20) are not supported by
the evidence.
Finding No. 17 relates to the modification of the
original plot plan by rotating the home so as to provide a direct view of the Salt Lake Valley. The record
reveals that Dr. Quagliana became unhappy with the
orientation of the house after viewing the open excavation (R. 172). Dr. Quagliana brought this dissatisfaction to the attention of KM Design and Exquisite (R.
172, 351), and directed that the house be rotated so
that the back of it would face the valley (R. 184). In
so directing, Dr. Quagliana advised Exquisite of his
intention to pay for the additional work in altering
the orientation of the home (R. 284). Exquisite acceded
to the wishes of Dr. Quagliana and the result was a
modification of the original plan to which the parties
agreed (R. 186, 200). As a portion of the evidence
supporting Finding No. 17, the Record shows the following exchange ( R . 1 8 4 ) :
"Q. Whose idea was it to modify the original plot
plan?
"A. As in the final plans?
Q. Yes, the original plot plan drawn by KM.
Whose idea was it to modify it?
„
A. Mine. It was my idea.
Q. Did you direct Mr. Marstella as to—precisely
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as to where that house should be positioned?
A. Not in detail. Only in generalities, in that I
thought it should be turned so that the back of it could
face the valley."
Finding No. 31 is concerned with proposals made
by Exquisite after the 30-foot setback requirement had
been discovered and with the readiness and willingness
of Exquisite to remedy the problem at its own expense.
Three parties, Dr. Quagliana, Marstella and Southam,
testified concerning the proposals or alternatives discussed on January 4, 1972 (R. 179, 290, 318). This
testimony clearly shows that Exquisite remained ready,
willing and able, at its own expense, to tear out the
foundation and start construction anew. The Record
reveals that Exquisite made arrangements with Terry
Fuller Excavating to tear out the concrete and remove
the same to North Salt Lake (R. 321, 326). The
record will show that Exquisite had a preference for
the alternative of purchasing the lot and foundation
and, after completing the home, selling on the speculative market. This alternative would have presented the
prospect of enhanced profits to Exquisite. However,
the price asked by Dr. Quagliana was so excessive that
it was not feasible to purchase the lot on speculation
(R. 294, 321). Marstella advised plaintiffs that their
asking price was excessive and that Exquisite would
tear out the foundation and relocate the home (R. 295,
Ex. 3-DE). However, Exquisite could not proceed
until the plaintiffs advised where they wanted the house
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located or in what respect they wanted the floor plan
to be changed. That information was never forthcoming
from the plaintiffs (R. 205, 321). The transcript reveals the following testimony from Glade Southam,
president of Exquisite (R. 318, 319):
"Q. Do you recall any proposals being made by
either Dr. Quagliana or Exquisite Homes on that occasion?
A. Yes. One proposal was tearing out the foundation and flopping the house plan over. Another proposal was to cut the garage off on an angle and to get
the 30-foot setback. Another one was to cut the garage
off straight across and the other was taking—purchasing the lot from the doctor and we continue the house
ourself.
Q. And who made those proposals ?
A. Exquisite Homes did. W e did.
Q. Did you personally make those proposals?
A. Yes.
Q. (By Mr. Harrison) Did you advise Dr. Quagliana that you were willing to take the expense of tearing out the foundation and starting over ?
MR. R O E : That is leading and I object.
T H E C O U R T : Yeah, a little bit but overrule.
H e may answer.
15
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T H E W I T N E S S : At the meeting on January
4th, it was indicated that we would stand the cost of
whichever way we went,, of tearing out the foundation
or cutting the garage off or what method we did go."
Plaintiffs also complain of Finding No. 33, but
admit that it is supported by some evidence. Evidence
in support of that Finding clearly appears on page
295 of the Record and in Exhibit 3-DE. Plaintiffs'
concern seems to have arisen in retrospect by its own
failure to counter the testimony of defendants' two
witnesses. During the course of plaintiffs' rebuttal case,
an objection was raised by the attorney for K M Design on the basis that the questioning of the plaintiff
was repetitious. I n fact, Dr. Quagliana had previously,
during plaintiffs' case in chief, been questioned concerning these same facts (R. 180, 181, 182, 198). The
Record will show that substantially the same question
was put to Dr. Quagliana during the presentation of
the plaintiffs' case in chief (R. 182). Following certain comments on the evidence, plaintiffs' counsel voluntarily elected not to pursue that line of questioning.
Plaintiffs' counsel clearly had an opportunity to put
further questions to his witness, but elected not to do so.
The reluctance of counsel to pursue that line of questioning is understandable, since he himself was a participant (R. 163, 294). Plaintiffs' counsel was reluctant to proceed in depth into those facts since to do so
would have required that counsel take the witness stand
and withdraw from the argument of the case. And the
16
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Court had previously instructed counsel as to the consequences of his taking the witness stand (R. 163).
Finally, error is claimed with regard to a comparison of the actual setback with that of the Salt Lake
City Zoning Ordinances and the restricive covenants
of the subdivision. The evidence will not support a
finding that the ordinances of Salt Lake City were
violated. The Record will disclose that Salt Lake City
did place a stop work order upon the project, but this
was done at the instance of the St. Mary's Hills Architectural Supervising Committee. In any event, work
had already stopped since the 30-foot setback requirement of the St. Mary's Hills Subdivision had become
known. With respect to the 30-foot setback requirement of the subdivision, Exquisite never contested the
facts which showed a violation of that requirement.
The Court did make Findings that the foundation
was constructed with a 20-foot setback between the
garage and the front property line and that the St.
Mary's Hills Architectural Supervising Committee required a 30-foot setback. Findings No. 13 and 14 indicate that the lot was originally staked and excavated
with a 20-foot setback. Finding No. 27 states that he
re-staking conformed to the amended plot plan as drawn
but not as amended by the word "average". Similarly,
Finding No. 24 indicates that the excavation was accomplished in accordance with the amended plot plan.
Finding No. 26 expressly states that the foundation was
constructed with a "20-foot setback". Finding No. 27
17
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expressly states that the St. Mary's Hills Architectural
Supervising Committee "required a 30-foot front setback". Finally, Finding No. 28 states that approval
was never received from the St. Mary's Hill Architectural Supervising Committee.
In any event, the Finding requested by plaintiffs
is properly categorized as a conclusion of law. The
Findings of the Court clearly show that the foundation
was constructed with a 20-foot setback and that the subdivision requirements were for a 30-foot setback.
Whether this is a violation, which it obviously is, requires the application of principles of law.

POINT II
AS A M A T T E R O F C O N T R A C T I N T E R PRETATION, EXQUISITE HOME BUILDERS, INC. C O M P L I E D W I T H T H E GENE R A L B U I L D I N G CONTRACT AND T H E
P L A N S AND SPECIFICATIONS INCORPORATED THEREIN.
The plans an dspecifications (Ex. 1-P) were made
a part of the contract by the reference contained in
paragraph No. 1 of the General Building Contract
(Ex. 2-P). The plans, in turn, consisted of eight detailed drawings and a plot plan (Ex. 1-P). Specifically, the General Building Contract stated that the
dwelling house should be constructed ". . . in strict ac18
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cordance with this contract, the plans and specifications
hereunto attached and made a part hereof and identified by the signatures of the parties hereto and in strict
compliance with all apphcable laws, ordinances and
other governmental regulations affecting such construction." (Ex. 2-P).
The General Building Contract was executed by
plaintiffs and Exquisite subsequent to the purchase of
the subject lot on Sherwood Drive (R. 199). Similarly,
the plans were drawn by KM Design prior to the execution of the contract (R. 337, Ex. 2-P). In drawing
those plans, KM Design had shown, on the plot plan,
the position of the structure in relationship to the property lines by the use of four separate dimensions (Ex.
1-P). In drawing that plot plan, KM Design assumed
the responsibility for the location of the home and attempted to satisfy that obligation by contacting officials of Salt Lake City (R. 288, 340, 352, 356). However, KM Design did not check on restrictive covenants
(R. 352). Upon cross examination, Mr. Margetts of
K M Design admitted that he felt some obligation to
contact Salt Lake City with regard to the setback requirements but that he did not contact any subdivision
committee because he thought the plot plan was satisfactory (R. 356):
"Q. Mr. Margetts, I understand that you checked
the setback requirements of this particular house and lot
with Salt Lake City; is that correct ? . ' . ' •
A. Yes.

.
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Q. And why did you check that setback requirement with Salt Lake City?
A. That is the first thing we do on a house, to
find out how big a house you can put on it. You certainly don't want to design a house and find out it is
too big for the property. It is just standard procedure
in our office. That is one of the first things you do.
Q. Did you feel some obligation to check those setback requirements ?
A. No, I didn't because I thought we were plenty
fine with the 20 and 30, in my conversation with the
City.
Q. But you felt some obligation to contact Salt
Lake City?
A. Yes, I contacted them.
Both Dr. Quagliana and Marstella of Exquisite
testified that they relied upon the plans and specifications drawn by KM Design (R. 186, 279). Specifically, Marstella testified that he used the plans and specifications (Ex. 1-P) in making a bid (B. 279, 280).
The plans and specifications were furnished to Exquisite by plaintiffs (R. 279).
This Court has previously held that when a contract refers to plans and specifications, the same are
incorporated into and become a part of the contract. In
Utah Lumber Co. v. James, 25 Utah 434, 71 Pac. 986,
987 (1903), this Court held that plans, specifications
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and detailed drawings which were referred to in the
contract ". . . became a part of the contract, equally
binding as the proposal itself."
In this particular case, the plot plan, and consequently the contract, required that the house be located
with a 20-foot setback between the garage and the
front property line (Ex. 1-P). Dr. Quagliana admitted that the initial excavation was made in accordance with the original plot plan as drawn by KM Design and that the subsequent excavation was made in
accordance with the modified plot plan (R. 185, 186) :
"Q. Was the initial excavation made in accordance with the original plot plan designed by K.M.?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. And the subsequent excavation was done in
accordance to your instructions; is that correct?
A. Well, it was done in accordance with a decision
made by all three of us. I t was not—I did not say,
"This is the way it will be and this is the way I want
you to do it." We decided to make a change with the
approval of Mr. Marstella and Mr. Margetts and myself.
Q. I t was your idea to make that change ?
A. Yes, it was.

. ,•

However, the plans and specifications, and particularly
the plot plan, turned out to be defective. The testimony adequately established the requirement of a 3021
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foot setback as imposed by the St. Mary's Hills Architectural Supervising Committee (R. 241).
Numerous cases can be found for the proposition
that a construction contractor who has followed plans
and specifications furnished by the owner, and which
have proved to be defective, will not be responsible for
the loss which results. In Bradford Builders, Inc. v.
Sears, Roebuck and Co., 270 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1959),
the fencing subcontractor was furnished a plot plan by
the general contractor. That plot plan showed the location where a fence was to be installed. The fencing
subcontractor installed the fence at the location shown
on the plot plan. The Court there held that since the
subcontractor was bound to build according to plans
and specifications, the subcontractor would not be held
responsible for the consequences of defects in those
plans and specifications. In Kelly v. Bank Building
and Equipment Corp. of America, 453 F . 2d 774 (10th
Cir. 1972), the building owner brought suit against the
contractor for improper installation of a curtain wall.
The trial court there found that the design of the curtain wall was deficient and that the curtain wall had
been installed pursuant to the plans and specifications.
In affirming for the contractor the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the owner's architect impliedly warranted the sufficiency of the overall construction plan and that this warranty was paramount
and controlling over any guarantee of completion by
the contractor. In Puget Sound National Bank of
Tacoma v. C. B. Lauch Const. Co., 73 Idaho 68, 245

22
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

P. 2d 800, 805 (1952), the painting was shown by F H A
to be unsatisfactory. However, the evidence sustained
a finding that the painting had been accomplished in
conformity with plans and specifications which had
been incorporated into the contract by reference. In
affirming for the painting contractor the Idaho Supreme Court stated:
"A contractor is required to follow the plans and
specifications and when he does so, he cannot be
held to guarantee that the work performed as
required by his contract will be free from defects, or withstand the action of the elements, or
that the completed job will accomplish the purpose intended. H e is only responsible for improper workmanship or other faults, or defects
resulting from his failure to perform."
The leading case in this respect is United States
v. Spectrin, 248 U.S. 132, 137, 63 L. Ed. 166, 39 S.
Ct. 59 (1918). In that case Spearin contracted to
build a dry dock at the Brooklyn Naval Yard in accordance with plans and specifications which had been
prepared by the government. Other contract provisions
required the contractor to examine the site for the purpose of ascertaining the actual conditions, to check the
plans, dimensions and elevations, and to stand responsible for the work until completion. The site was intersected by a 6-foot brick sewer which was required to be
relocated. The plans and specifications provided that
the contractor should do the work and prescribed the
dimensions, material, and location of the sewer section
to be substituted. All the prescribed requirements were
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fully complied with by Speann. Speaking through
Justice Brandeis, the United States Supreme Court affirmed for the contractor:
". . . But the insertion of the articles prescribing
the character, dimensions and location of the
sewer imported a warranty that, if the specifications were complied with, the sewer would be
adequate. This implied warranty is not overcome
by the general clauses requiring the contractor,
to examine the site, to check up the plans, and
to assume responsibility for the work until completion and acceptance. The obligation to examine the site did not impose upon him the duty of
making a diligent enquiry into the history of
the locality with a view to determining, at his
peril, whether the sewer specifically prescribed
by the Government would prove adquate. The
duty to check plans did not impose the obligation
to pass upon their adequacy to accomplish the
purpose in view. And the provision concerning
contractor's responsibility cannot be construed
as abridging rights arising under specific provisions of the contract."
The rule announced by these cases, that the owner
is responsible for defects in plans and specifications, has
become well settled in practically every American jurisdiction. 13 Am. J u r 2d, Building and Construction
Contracts, Sec .28.
The Spearin case suggests that the plans and specifications, being more specific, must control over more
general language. This would appear to be a specific
application of the standard given in Restatement, Con-
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tracts, Section 236 (c), and adopted in Waterway
Terminals Co. v. P.S. Lord Mechanical Contractors^
242 Oregon 1, 406 P . 2d 556, 13 A.L.R. 3d 1 (1965).
Those authorities indicate that a specific provision will
ordinarily qualify the meaning of a more general provision.
In this particular case, the plot plan showed precisely where the building was to fit upon the lot. This
was accomplished by giving four dimensions from various points on the structure to various points on the
property lines (Ex. 1-P). It is not conceivable that
the position of that home could have been given more
specifically. Any other location would have changed
those dimensions and completely nullified the entire
plot plan.
The plaintiffs in this case have complained as to
this defendant's interpretation of the contract and as
to the position where the foundation was ultimately
constructed. However, the plaintiffs have never indicated where their interpretation of the contract would
place the structure. The undisputed testimony in this
case was that the house would physically fit on the
subject lot with appropriate 30-foot setbacks (R. 291,
319). However, the satisfaction of two 30-foot setback requirements would have oriented the house so
that a direct view of the Salt Lake Valley would not
have been presented (JR. 292). The Record is replete
with references to the view as being very important to
the plaintiffs (R. 185, 188, 283). Even after Exquisite
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agreed to tear out the foundation and start construction
anew, at its own expense, the plaintiffs never could or
did decide where the home should be positioned upon
the lot.
This Court has, on many occasions, adopted the
rule of construction that the proper interpretation of a
contract is the interpretation placed upon it by the
parties through their acts and conduct. Roberts v.
Tuttle, 36 Utah 614, 105 Pac. 916 (1909); Trucker
Sales Corp. v. Potter, 104 Utah 1, 137 P . 2d 370
(1943); and Hardinge Co. v. Eimco Corp., 1 Utah 2d
320, 266 P.2d 494 (1954). It is interesting to note in
this respect what Dr. Quagliana stated regarding the
contractual right of Exquisite to position the home
otherwise than as shown on the plot plan:
"Q. (By Mr. Harrison) Was Exquisite Home
Builders at liberty to alter the position of that home as
shown on the original plot plan ?
A. No. This question had never arisen. (R. 197)
This Court has decided many cases under the rule
of interpretation that a contract must be construed most
strongly against the party responsible for the draftsmanship. Wingets, Inc. v. Bitters, 28 Utah 2d 231, 500 P .
2d 1007 (1972) ; Seal v. Tayco, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 323,
400 P . 2d 503 (1965); Guinand v. Walton, 22 Utah 2d
196, 450 P . 2d 467 (1969); Skousen v. Smith, 27 Utah
2d 169, 493 P . 2d 1003 (1972) ; Penn Star Mining Co.
v. Lyman, 64 Utah 343, 231 Pac. 107 (1924); and
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Mifflin v. Shiki, 77 Utah 190, 293 Pac. 1 (1930).
The record clearly shows that the subject contract
was drawn by an agent of plaintiffs (R. 254, 281).

POINT III
A G R E E M E N T OF T H E P A R T I E S UPON
A SECOND PLOT P L A N R E S U L T E D IN A
M O D I F I E D CONTRACT W H I C H
SUPERS E D E D T H E F I R S T TO T H E E X T E N T O F
ANY INCONSISTENCIES.
The general building contract contained a paragraph requiring any changes in the terms of the contract or the plans and specifications to be in writing
(Ex. 2-P). This Court has held on several occasions
that the parties to a written contract may modify, waive
or make new terms notwithstanding such language.
Davis v. Payne § Day, Inc., 10 Utah 2d 53, 348 P . 2d
337 (1960) ; Wilson v. Gardner, 10 Utah 2d 89, 348 P .
2d 931 (1960); Calhoun v. Universal Credit Co., 106
Utah 166, 146 P . 2d 284 (1944) ; Rhodes v. Clute, 17
Utah 137, 53 Pac. 990 (1898); and PLC Landscape
Construction v. Piccadilly Fish'N Chips, Inc., 28 Utah
2d 350,502 P.2d 562 (1972).
These expressions of the Utah Supreme Court are
consistent with the general rule as found in 17A C.J.S.,
Contracts, Section 377 (c), and 13 Am; Jur.2d, Build-
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ing and Construction Contract*, Section 14. The latte^
states the rule this way:
"Although stipulations in building or construction contracts requiring written orders or agreements for extra work or alterations are valid and
binding so long as they remain in effect, it is
equally well settled that they may be avoided by
the parties to the contract. The courts have
adopted various theories of avoidance, which may
be classified as those of independent contract,
modification or recission, waiver, and estoppel.
"A waiver of such stipulation by the owner is
the theory on which it is most frequently avoided.
Among the acts or conduct amounting to waiver
are the owner's knowledge of, agreement to, or
acquiesence in, such extra work, a course of dealing which repeatedly disregards such stipulation,
and a promise to pay for extra work, orally requested by the owner and performed in reliance
on that promise."
The evidence in this case clearly shows that Dr.
Quagliana, after becoming dissatisfied with the view,
originated the idea to modify the original plot plan (R.
184). Dr. Quagliana then directed Mr. Marstella to
position the home "so that the back of it could face
the valley" (R. 184). At that time Dr. Quagliana advised Exquisite that he would pay for the contract
change (R. 284). Dr. Quagliana himself testified that
the second excavation was done ". . . in accordance with
a decision made by all three of us . . ." (R. 186). Dr.
Quagliana expressly stated that the original plan and
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specifications, which were a part of the contract, had
been modified (R. 200):
"Q. But you modified those original plans and
specifications, did you not?
A. Yes.''
As noted, Dr. Quagliana directed Exquisite to
rotate the house so that the back of it could face the
valley (R. 184). This is clearly inconsistent with the
language of the general building contract (Ex. 2-P)
which authorized the contractor to locate the building
upon the site. In fact, Dr. Quagliana specifically testified that Exquisite was not at liberty to alter the position of the home (R. 197). This direction to locate the
home so that the back of it could face the valley is
clearly inconsistent with the positioning of that home
so that the back of it would face the mountains and
neighboring houses. This latter view was the only one
available if the 30-foot set back requirement was to be
met (R. 292, 320).
I t is a well established principle of law that a
second agreement will govern over inconsistent terms
of an earlier contract between the same parties. Restatement, Contracts, Section 408. That principle was
adopted by this Court in the case of Mawhinney v. Jensen, 120 Utah 142, 232 P.2d 769 (1951). A general
statement of that principle is found in 17A C.J.S.,
Contracts, Section 379:
"An agreement, when changed by the mutual
consent of the parties, becomes a new agreement,
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which takes the place of the old and determines
the rights of the parties thereto. In such case,
the agreement between the parties consists of the
new terms and as much of the old agreement as
the parties have agreed shall remain unchanged,
in other words, a contract may be abrogated in
part and stand as to the residue and the new
contract supersedes the first to the extent that
the two will be unable to stand together" (Italics
added)
Principles of contract modifications are clearly applicable to building and construction contracts where
the modification sometimes results from express or implied waiver.
"The foregoing rules, as to alteration or modification of contracts by mutual consent, have been
applied to building and construction contracts.
Thus the contractor and the owner may, by subsequent agreement, modify the original contract
and authorize or require deviations and departures therefrom; and the new agreement either expressly or impliedly may waive any right either
would otherwise have had; . . ." 17A C.J.S.,
Contracts, Section 373 (b)
These principles have found application in the
case of Driver-Miller Plumbing, Inc. v. Fromm, 72
N. M. 117, 381 P . 2d 53 (1963). That case involved a
suit brought by a heating subcontractor against the
owner-general contractor of a home. The owner-general
contractor defended on the basis that the heating system failed to heat satisfactorily. The evidence there
showed that the owner-general contractor obtained the
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specifications and gave them to the heating subcontractor. Also, the owner-general contractor gave the
heating subcontractor directions with reference to deviations from the specifications. On the basis of those
facts, the Court stated its holding on page 54:
"The court found, and the finding is amply supported by adequate proof under the most stringent requirements, that the installation was made
by plaintiff in accordance with instructions from
Melvin B. Fromm, the general contractor, and
with his knowledged and acquiescence. Accordingly, no complaint can be made that plaintiff
failed to comply strictly with the original specifications."

P O I N T IV
PLAINTIFFS WRONGFULLY RESCINDE D T H E CONTRACT W H I L E E X Q U I S I T E
HOME
BUILDERS,
INC.,
REMAINED
R E A D Y , W I L L I N G A N D A B L E TO COMP L E T E T H E CONTRACT W I T H I N T H E
TIME PROVIDED.
The plaintiffs' letter of March 9, 1972, terminating the right of Exquisite to proceed under the contract (Ex. 16-DE) and plaintiffs' Complaint (R. 141)
were both predicated upon a total breach by failure to
situate the home in accordance with building restrict i o n and inability to complete the home within the time
contemplated by the contract. The contract did require
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completion of the dwelling within 180 days from the
date of commencement (Ex.-2P). Commencement was
not required until ten days after funds were deposited
with Prudential Federal Savings in the construction
trust fund account (Ex. 2-P). Mr. Roof of Prudential
Federal Savings testified that funds were deposited
into the construction trust fund account on November
26, 1971 (R. 250, 253). The elapse of 180 days would
have placed the completion date on approximately
April 26, 1972. However, the general building contract, in paragraph No. 5, provided an extension of
time for changes and unusual delays beyond the control of the contractor, and the Record discloses that the
rotation of the home and poor weather, alone, caused
a five week delay (Ex. 3-DE). Furthermore, the contract, paragraph number 6, provided a penalty for delay of $12.92 per day as liquidated damages.

j
j
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j
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It should require no citation of authority to establish that an owner cannot anticipate the default of the
contractor and, on that basis, terminate the contract.
This is particularly so, when the contract provides for
liquidated damages in the event of a delay in completion. 13 Am. Jur. 2d, Building and Construction Contracts, Section 47. The plaintiffs' sole remedy for failure to complete the contract within the time specified
was the collection or retention of liquidated damages
under the contract at the rate of $12.92 per day; the
plaintiffs cannot anticipatorily repudiate the contract
for failing to complete the home within the time con-
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templated by the contract when at least 47 days remain before completion is required.
Our facts are similar in this respect to those in the
oft-cited case of Brady v. Oliver, 125 Tenn. 595, 147
S.W. 1135 (1911). That case similarly involved a construction contract where the owner anticipated a failure to perform at a time prior to the time set for completion. The court there contrasted that case with those
where the contractor had abandoned the contract or had
renounced the contract and refused to proceed under
it. The Court there held that the disability could not
be anticipated. Such a factual situation would seem to
be within the scope of the rule announced in Retatement, Contracts, Section 323. It should be noted, however, that that section is premised upon a defective performance. Explanatory comment (c), page 487, reads
as follows:
"Frequently a period of time is allowed by a
contract within which a party thereto may perform a promise. In such a case tender of defective performance does not necessarily show
that if the tender is refused, correct performance
will not be rendered within the period allowed
by the contract. Even if performance must be
on a particular day, it may be possible to remedy
a defective tender made on that day. . . ."
The testimony in this case clearly shows that Exquisite remained ready, willing and able to tear out the
foundation and relocate the house at its own expense.
This willingness to proceed with construction was com-
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municated to plaintiffs on at least four separate occasions (R. 294, 295, 318, Ex. 3-DE). Exquisite even
proceeded to the point of contacting a contractor who
would remove the foundation (R. 321), and locating a
place in North Salt Lake where the broken concrete
could be dumped (R. 326). However, Exquisite could
not proceed further until the plaintiffs advised where
they wanted the house located or in what respect they
wanted the floor plan to be changed. The concrete
foundation could not be removed since some alternatives
involving a modification of the floor plan contemplated
utilizing a portion of the foundation. However, plaintiffs never authorized Exquisite to continue with the
construction or advised as to the desired position for the
home (R. 295, 321). The Record is absolutely devoid
of any indication that Exquisite was unwilling or unable to continue the construction.
Even if the performance of Exquisite was considered to be defective, the plaintiffs would have no right
to repudiate the contract under the facts of this case.
In order to justify rescission, the breach must go to the
root of the contract. The act complained of must involve an unqualified refusal to perform and should
amount to a determination not to be bound by the contract in the future. 17A C.J.S., Contracts, Section 422
(1). Grounds for rescission or termination of a building and construction contract is the subject of 17A
C.J.S., Contracts, Section 422 ( 2 ) :
"The builder's fault is not a ground for rescis-
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sion by the owner, where it is caused by the owner's failure to perform, or by the wrongful acts
or omissions of the owner or his architect or
engineer.
"It is not every partial neglect or refusal to
comply with the terms of the contract by the
builder which will entitle the owner to rescind,
but the default must be substantial and of such
a character as indicates an intention on the part
of the builder to abandon the contract', there
must be an actual default, unequivocal renunciation, or legal disability to perform on his
p a r t . . . . " (Italics added)
This Court has had occasion to require such an intention on the part of the promisor to abandon the contract before permitting termination or repudiation. In
Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes, 1 Utah 2d 9, 261 P . 2d 927
(1953), a real estate listing agreement required that
the sale be consummated before a commission was paid.
The buyer and seller signed an earnest money receipt
and offer to purchase, but at that point the seller suffered a change of mind and wilfully refused to cooperate. This Court held that, even though the agreement
required & consummated sale and even though the sale
was not consummated, the broker was still entitled to
his commission. The Court found that the buyer remained ready, willing and able to perform and that the
failure of the transaction to be consummated resulted
from the arbitrary refusal of the owner to perform his
part of the transaction. The Court further held that
the agreement contemplated that the owner would co-
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operate in good faith toward the accomplishment of the
contract purpose. In Haymore v. Levinson, 8 Utah 2d
66, 328 P . 2d 307 (1958), the builder was obligated to
complete a list of defects in the construction of a home.
However, the owner would not allow the builder to proceed in correcting those defects until other items were
completed. This Court held that the owner had prevented the builder from further performance and therefore could not take advantage of the failure of performance.
The case of Parrish v. Tahtaras, 7 Utah 2d 87,
318 P.2d 642 (1957), has a factual situation which very
closely parallels the facts of this case. I n that case Tahtaras engaged the services of architect Parrish to design
a residence on a lot then owned. Under the terms of the
agreement, the total cost of the residence could not exceed $65,000.00, including architect's fees. The architect prepared sketches, drawing and specifications, but
the bids ranged from $73,280.00 to $90,000.00. Tahtaras then directed the architect to make alterations in
the plans, but all bids were again rejected. Tahtaras
then notified the architect of his intention to abandon
the project of constructing a residence. This Court
held that the architect, having remained ready, willing
and able to proceed with the modifications after having
twice before failed, was entitled to collect for his services. On page 645, this Court stated:
«* * *• The defendants abandoned by an unequivocal act the project after they had told the plaintiff to go ahead and modify the plans to come
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within the cost limitations set, and while plaintiff remained ready, willing and able to proceed
with such modifications for a second time, the
first modification having been rebid and rejected
by the defendants. In the case of abandonment
by the owners of their contract with an architect,
where the architect is in the process of fulfilling
the conditions under his contract for services, the
architect may bring an action for damages on the
contract, or in the alternative, sue in quasi contract under the theory of quantum meruit. * * *•"
The conduct of Exquisite in remaining ready, willing and able to reconstruct the home as directed by
plaintiffs, contrasts sharply with the conduct of plaintiffs. Here the plaintiffs simply had a change of mind
and decided that they did not want to construct that
particular plan upon that particular lot. In this respect, it must be recognized that the lot had been purchased and the plans drawn considerably prior to the
contract date of October 7,1971. Because of this change
of mind, the plaintiffs simply refused to permit Exquisite to proceed with construction. On January 3,
1972, plaintiffs ordered their agent to pay no further
installments of the contract price (R. 189, 256, Ex. 13D E ) . Then, after great delay, the plaintiffs notified
Exquisite in writing that they did not wish to proceed
further with the construction and considered themselves excused from further performance. (Ex. 16DE)
The letter of March 9, 1972, is clearly in repudi-
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ation of the entire contract. Similarly, the failure to
pay an installment of the contract price as provided in
a building or construction contract gives the contractor
the right to consider the contract at an end. 13 Am.
Jur. 2d, Building and Construction Contracts, Section
102; and Gabriel v. Corkum, 183 Oregon 679, 196 P .
2d 437 (1948).
Such an abandonment by the owners of their contract with the contractor, enables the contractor to recover for damages on the contract, or in the alternative,
in quasi contract under the theory of quantum meruit.
Citing abundant authority, this Court held in Par risk v.
Tahtaras, supra, that recovery could be had either on
the contract or in quantum meruit. In this case Exquisite elected to counterclaim on the contract as
amended.

CONCLUSION
Exquisite Home Builders, Inc. signed the contract
with plaintiffs on October 7, 1971 —- several months
after the Sherwood Drive lot had been purchased and
the plans drawn. The work of Exquisite conformed to
the plans and specifications, and after the plans were
amended its work conformed to the amended plans.
Plaintiffs have complained that the positioning of
the house by Exquisite was wrong, but plaintiffs have
never, in the trial or in their brief, stated where the
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house should have been positioned. If the plaintiffs
would have stated their desires as to the position of the
home, the same would have been completed since Exquisite remained ready, willing and able to perform. The
truth is that the plaintiffs suffered a change of mind
and refused to cooperate with Exquisite.
The responsibility for the defective plans and
specifications rests with the owners or with those designing the plans on behalf of the owners. The fact
remains that the plans were drawn for the owners prior
to the involvement of Exquisite, and that the plans
were drawn defectively.
The judgment rendered for Exquisite Home
Builders, Inc. against plaintiffs should be affirmed,
and Exquisite should recover its costs on appeal, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Respectfully submitted,
O R V A L C. H A R R I S O N
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
Exquisite Home Builders, Inc.
15 East 4th South
Salt Lake Citv, Utah

39
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

